



SUMMARIES

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LEFT LIBERAL CRITICISM OF VULGAR NAZI ANTISEMITISM IN 1935 (ON THE MATERIALS OF «PARISER TAGESZEITUNG» NEWSPAPER)

After establishment of Hitler dictatorship left liberal German journalists founded in France the newspaper «Pariser Tageszeitung». This publication criticized the Nazi policy, paying attention to antisemitic views and actions of the Nazis. The greatest interest of left liberal emigrants to pogrom and vulgar antisemitism in the Third Reich was in 1935. The analysis of the articles published in the «Pariser Tageszeitung» allows to make the meaningful conclusions about the vision, content and scale of left liberal critic of vulgar Nazi antisemitism and to reveal some methods and ways of Nazi propaganda being taken on board by left liberals.

The author comes to the conclusion that left liberal critic of vulgar antisemitism in the Third Reich was the part of their struggle against the Hitler regime, against National Socialism ideology and policy. «Pariser Tageszeitung» stuff cultivated their own style of giving information, which provoked readers' disgust towards gauleiter Julius Streicher, who was the main propagandist of vulgar antisemitic views, and towards his weekly «Der Stürmer». Left liberal appraisals of pogrom antisemitism propaganda were based on such fundamental values as liberty of speech, civil equality

and human dignity. Journalists tried to show to anti-fascist community the pathological and irrational nature of the Nazi antisemitic manifestations, inhumanity and amorality of the persecution of the German Jews. Left liberal emigrants disclosed the relationship between the Julius Streicher primitive antisemitic constructions and his hostility towards Christian religion and church. They discovered that other officials and instances in Nazi party and government supported propagandistic efforts of Franken Gauleiter. Hence, popularization of ideas about “the Jewish conspiracy”, “race desecration” and “Impraegnierung” were given to «Pariser Tageszeitung» readers not only as one of the symptoms of pathological disease of antisemitic and sexual psychopath Julius Streicher, but also as a part of general project of the whole Nazi top, aimed on the “seduction” of German people. The aspiration of militant antisemitic pogrom-makers for corrupting of growing up generation of Germans and for converting it into the convinced participator of Jews persecution caused the special anxiety of left liberals. The weak points of left liberal analysis of vulgar antisemitic phenomenon in 1935 were underestimation of Streicher’s propaganda efficiency, on one hand, and overestimation of German immunity to antisemitism virus and insufficient study of the matter about its mass foundation, on the other hand.

SIMONETTA MILLI KONEWKO

SURVIVAL IN AUSCHWITZ AND COMPASSIONATE BONDS IN THE CAMPS

This article examines Primo Levi’s *Survival in Auschwitz* and argues that theories of emotion and compassion may highlight different dimensions of life in the concentration camps. While most research on Holocaust survivors focuses on scrutinizing personalities and investigating how individuals have been influenced by their experiences, Levi’s examination centers also on emotional material. His writing reflects a desire to portray circumstances objectively and analyze the emotional reasons behind them. The present study investigates Levi’s *Survival in Auschwitz* in light of the theory of the emotions, in particular compassion. Although the horrors of the camps and

their common condition of isolation are regular elements of Levi's work, he also presents specific situations in which emotional participation emerges offering precious material to illustrate the theory of compassion as well as revising some of its components. To comprehend those rare moments that generate compassionate participation and shed some light on compassion itself, this analysis refers also to those ordinary conditions that prevent this emotion. The article examines examples of compassion as well as deceptive compassion in order to highlight the prisoners' resistance to the camps' laws. Moreover, to clarify the significance of compassion, this emotion is differentiated from other similar emotional states. In fact, there is a clear variability in how theorists of emotions use the term of pity, sympathy, empathy, and compassion. But specifically, how does Levi employ compassion and for which purposes? What kind of participation constitutes a compassionate experience? What attributes of compassion are illustrated in order to fight Nazi ideology? Who are the subjects who merit compassion? In order to inquire these issues, this article takes into account the theoretical discourse on compassion developed by some important scholars of the emotions such as Martha Nussbaum, Maureen Whitebrook, John Portmann, Jeanine Young-Mason, and Elizabeth Porter.

JOACHIM NEANDER

THE IMAGE OF AUSCHWITZ IN HISTORY POLITICS

There are few places on Earth that are as burdened with symbolic meaning as Auschwitz.¹ The name of the largest Nazi concentration and extermination camp, where about 1.2 million human beings, among them nearly one million Jews, were murdered, has not only become a metaphor for the Holocaust itself. In world public perception, *Auschwitz* stands not only for genocide and mass killing, but for generic evil per se.

¹ In the following, Auschwitz (in Roman letters) is used to denote the historical entity and the place, whereas *Auschwitz* (in Italics) shall denote Auschwitz as a symbolic entity.

From the beginning of its existence as a Nazi concentration camp for Poles in May 1940, Auschwitz has always been an object of politics. This did not end with the liberation of the camp by Soviet troops on January 27, 1945. Only the way *Auschwitz* was used in politics has changed, under the influence of group interests and the needs of domestic and foreign politics, over time and with the places, where reference has been made to Auschwitz. Its worldwide fame and symbolic content have tempted politicians of all leanings from all Western countries, from environmentalists to anti-abortionists, from animal rights activists to a former German Minister of Defense, to (mis-)use *Auschwitz* for justifying their own political aims and morally discrediting their opponents. Holocaust deniers also exploit *Auschwitz* for their political aims, claiming to “debunk” it as “the biggest hoax of the 20th century”.

Historical Auschwitz showed four “faces”: the Main Camp, Birkenau, and the set of sub-camps—which altogether constituted “German Auschwitz”—and “Communist Auschwitz,” the set of Polish and Soviet postwar slave labor and transition camps that were established on the premises after liberation. For political reasons, Communist Auschwitz has remained a blank area on the map of history, and in the public sphere worldwide, only German Auschwitz is commemorated. Because of the latter’s different “faces,” which, moreover, were steadily changing in space and time, already among the survivors of German Auschwitz different images of *Auschwitz* originated, giving rise to diverse (and often conflicting) collective memories in different societies.

Immediately after the war, a (Polish) State Museum was established in the former Main Camp and in parts of Birkenau. It was conceived as a place for remembering Polish martyrdom under German occupation and had a strictly anti-German message. During the Cold War, the museum also served for anti-Western agitation in general. Beginning in the 1960s, permanent national exhibitions (“pavilions”) were added. They have served first and foremost for conveying the exhibitors’ view of history. An unsolved dispute between Poland and Russia about history still prevents the opening of a Russian exhibition. The museum has not only become a place of research and education, but also a regional tourist magnet with over a million visitors yearly from all over the Globe. On a par with Yad Vashem and the

USHMM, it is one of the major places in the world where the Holocaust is conveyed to the masses and where the image of the Holocaust in public perception is shaped.

The article focuses on the role *Auschwitz* has played in Polish and Jewish history politics. During Communist rule, the plight of the Jews was remembered, but came second place. In the foreground stood the martyrdom and the heroism of the political prisoners, their steadfast international solidarity, and the leading role of Communist activists in the camp resistance. After the downfall of Communism in 1989/1990, the tables were turned: Jews, by far the most numerous group of *Auschwitz* victims, have come first place, visibly expressed in the new permanent exhibition.

In Poland's political life, *Auschwitz* still today plays an important role. Nationalists use it for stirring up anti-German sentiments for domestic use ("remember *Auschwitz*"), and it is even occasionally used in foreign politics ("branding the *Auschwitz* club" over Germany). With regard to the Jews, official Polish history presents Poland as the only country in the world that was always friendly to Jews and depicts the Poles as noble saviors of Jewish lives during the Holocaust. This image, however, is contested by the Jews, who remember the passivity of the vast majority of Poles—and the complicity of a non-negligible minority with the Germans—during the Holocaust, the postwar pogroms of Cracow and Kielce, and Polish profiteering by appropriating Jewish property after the war.

Poles and Jews are fighting a highly emotionally charged battle: Who has the right to define *Auschwitz*? Or more sharply accentuated: To whom does *Auschwitz* belong? In the last decades, the Jewish side has successfully gained terrain. Powerful political demonstrations, such as the annual "March of the Living," or flybys by military aircraft, underline Jewish claims to *Auschwitz*, which are not restricted to the area of the former camp, situated in a southwestern neighborhood of the Polish provincial town of Oświęcim, whose inhabitants have to live with many a restriction on their religious and everyday life demanded by Jewish organizations and, for political reasons, carried through by the Polish government (e.g. no crosses, no disco, no supermarket, no logistics center in the vicinity). For *Auschwitz*, it seems, neither an "end of history," nor an answer to the question "Whose *Auschwitz* is *Auschwitz*?" is in sight.